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Abstract
Market equilibria of matching markets offer an intuitive and fair solution for matching prob-
lems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching market
can be viewed as a variation of Fisher market, albeit with rather peculiar preferences of agents.
These preferences can be described by piece-wise linear concave (PLC) functions, which however,
are not separable (due to each agent only asking for one item), are not monotone, and do not
satisfy the gross substitute property– increase in price of an item can result in increased demand
for the item. Devanur and Kannan in FOCS 08 showed that market clearing prices can be found
in polynomial time in markets with fixed number of items and general PLC preferences. They
also consider Fischer markets with fixed number of agents (instead of fixed number of items),
and give a polynomial time algorithm for this case if preferences are separable functions of the
items, in addition to being PLC functions.
Our main result is a polynomial time algorithm for finding market clearing prices in matching
markets with fixed number of different agent preferences, despite that the utility corresponding
to matching markets is not separable. We also give a simpler algorithm for the case of matching
markets with fixed number of different items.
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1 Introduction
We consider the problem of matching without money with n agents who have preferences over m
items. This problem models a range of situations from assigning students to schools, applicants
to jobs, or people to committees. We call such an assignment problem a matching problem, if all
agents are required to get a fixed number of items. An intuitive application is the school choice
problem. Students have preferences over schools, and each student needs to get assigned to exactly
one school. In this paper we will consider computing the fair randomized solution to this problem
proposed by [HZ79] based on market equilibria.
We model the preferences of agents with the value of agent i for being assigned to item j is vij .
Using values allows agents to express the intensity of their preferences. An important property of
an allocation is its efficiency. Since agents utilities are meaningless to compare (without money,
there is no natural unit to express utility), the best we can hope for is a Pareto-efficient allocation.
An allocation is Pareto inefficient if there is an alternate allocation where no agent is worse off, and
at least one agent has improved utility. We will consider fractional or randomized allocation. The
value of an agent i for the fractional allocation xij is
∑
j vijxij , if it obeys the matching constraint.
This is the agent’s expected value, if xij is the probability of assigning item j to agent i.
Market equilibria offer an intuitive, fair, and Pareto-efficient solution for problems of allocations
of resources to agents who have their own (incomparable) preferences over the items in systems with
no money. This was proposed by [HZ79] in the context of matching markets, and by [DFH+12] (see
also [GN12] and [WM15]), in the context of allocation of resources in systems. The idea is to endow
each agent with equal resource: a unit of (artificial) money. A set of prices p for the items is market
clearing, if there is a fractional allocation x of items to agents such that the following conditions
hold (i) each item is allocated at most once, (ii) each agents is allocated her favorite set of items
subject to the budget constraint1 that
∑
j xijpj ≤ 1, and (iii) the market clears, meaning that all
items not fully allocated have price 0. [HZ79] showed that such market equilibria is guaranteed
to exists, see also Appendix C. We view the resulting fractional (or randomized) allocation x as
a fair solution to the allocation problem without money, which is also clearly Pareto-efficient and
envy-free (no agent prefers the allocation of another agent).2 We are concerned with computing
this solution efficiently.
Computing Market Equilibria and the Odd Demand Structure of Matching Markets.
Market equilibrium problems where demands satisfy the gross substitute condition are well under-
stood [CV07], and can be computed efficiently. The demand structure of our matching problem
does not satisfy the gross substitutability condition, which requires that decreasing the price of an
item (while keeping all other prices fixed) should never decrease the demand for that item. We
show an example in Appendix B.1 that decreased price can cause decreased demand in a matching
markets. It is not hard to gain intuition for the phenomena: with the decreased price the agent
could get her old allocation, and would have money leftover. In other markets, money can be
used to buy additional items. However, in a matching market additional item makes no sense, and
instead, the agent may want to exchange his share of a cheaper and less favorable item (possibly
the item whose price decreased) for share of a more valuable expensive item.
1Note that agents have no use for the (artificial) money and are simply optimizing their allocated item, subject
to their budget.
2An alternate way to arrive to the same solution concept is to assign each agent an equal share of each resource,
and then look for an equilibrium of the resulting exchange market. To see that this results in an identical outcome,
we can think of each agents trade, as a two step-process, where he first sells all his allocated share on the market
prices, and then uses the resulting money to buy his optimal allocation.
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[DK08] gave an algorithm to compute market equilibria in markets with a fixed number of
items, where agents have piece-wise linear concave (PLC) utility functions, despite the fact that
PLC utility functions can give rise to demand not satisfying the gross substitute condition. They
also gave a polynomial time algorithm to compute market equilibria in markets with a fixed number
of agents, where agents have piece-wise linear concave and separable utility functions. They leave
as an open problem to give a polynomial time algorithm to compute market equilibria in markets
with a fixed number of agents and general PLC utilities that are not separable. We will show in
Section 2 that demand structure of the matching market can be modeled by a piece-wise linear
concave (PLC) utility function, which however, is neither separable nor monotone. This allows
us to use the algorithm of [DK08] to find a market equilibrium is the number of goods is fixed,
but leaves open the question whether market equilibrium can be found in polynomial time if the
number of different agents is finite instead.
Our Results. We give a polynomial time exact algorithm for finding market equilibria of match-
ing markets with a fixed number of agents, extending the work of [DK08] to the case of matching
markets with a fixed number of agents, despite the fact that utilities describing matching markets
are not separable. Our algorithm in Section 3 is based on the structural Theorem 3.10, and explores
a polynomial number of possible player utility values and allocation structures, and finds a market
equilibrium in polynomial time when the number of agents is fixed. The algorithm also extend to
the case when there are only a finite number of different agent utility types.
In case of large number of items and finite number of agents, when each individual item is
insignificant, our allocation can be used for finding an approximately optimal integer solution. We
achieve this by showing in Lemma 3.8 that we find an allocation in which the number of items
which are shared by the agents is O(n2), which is constant when the number of agents is constant.
In Appendix A, we consider the problem with a fixed number of goods. In this case, the algo-
rithm of [DK08] can find market equilibria in polynomial time. We give a simpler algorithm which
is tailored for matching markets. With m different goods and n agents, our algorithm enumerates
a polynomial number of different set of prices and allocation structures for the equilibrium.
Related Work. The problem of fairly allocating items to unit demand agents without money
has been studied extensively in both Economics and Computer Science literature. Perhaps the
most well known solution to this problem is the random serial dictatorship (RSD) [AS98] — also
known as random priority (RP) — in which agents are served sequentially according to a random
permutation, and each agent in turn receives her most preferred item among the remaining ones.
Clearly, serial dictatorship is Pareto efficient, and as a result, RSD is ex post Pareto-efficient,
i.e., Pareto-efficient given the order used. However, the expected allocation of RSD may not be
Pareto-efficient, i.e., its not interim Pareto-efficient. In Appendix B.1 we give an example where
the expected allocation of RSD can be Pareto improved just using the order of player preferences,
showing that RSD may be Pareto-inefficient even with ordinal preferences.
An alternative solution called probabilistic serial (PS) was proposed by [BM01] which is both
envy-free and Pareto-efficient with respect to ordinal preferences. The PS mechanism is, however,
not Pareto-efficient with cardinal preferences. This is possible, as ordinal preferences are not
always sufficient for ranking the randomized (interim) allocations, (i.e., ranking of distributions
over outcomes).
The mechanism we study in this paper, based on market equilibrium from equal income, has
been proposed in this context by [HZ79], is both envy-free and Pareto-efficient even with respect
to cardinal preferences. Note that neither PS nor the market equilibrium mechanism is strategy-
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proof. However, [Zho90] shows that for n ≥ 3 agents there is no mechanism that is strategyproof,
Pareto-efficient, and envy-free.
[HZ79] proves that equilibrium is guaranteed to exist (see also Appendix C), and propose
an exponential time algorithm for finding approximate equilibrium, whereas the current paper
proposes an exact algorithm for computing equilibrium which runs in polynomial time when either
the number of agents or the number of items is constant. Most of the recent work on the problem of
assignment without money has been focused on analyzing the efficiency of RSD and PS mechanism
under cardinal and/or ordinal preferences, e.g., [BCK11, ASZ14].
The main techniques used in the current paper are based on the cell decomposition result of
[BPR98] which has also been used by [DK08] to derive a polynomial time algorithm for a related
market equilibrium computation problem. We show how to find equilibria of matching problems in
polynomial time when the number of agents is fixed. In Appendix A we also give an algorithm to
find equilibria in matching markets with a fixed number of goods. While the algorithm of [DK08]
can be used for this latter case, our algorithm is simpler: we avoid some complications (for instance
their primal dual technique for checking the market clearing conditions), and we use a simpler cell
decomposition theorem. The case of fixed number of agents has been studied by [EW12]. However,
they assume that the agents’ utility functions are strictly concave and strictly monotone, which
does not apply to our problem. They also approximate the Walrasian equilibrium, while our main
goal is to find the exact value of equilibrium prices and allocations.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we review the matching problem with additive preferences and the market equilibrium
solution we aim to compute. Then we’ll discuss our main technical tool, the cell decomposition
technique of Basu, Pollack, and Roy [BPR98].
The Matching Problem The problem is defined by a set of m items, and Cj ≥ 0 amount
available of item j, and a set of n agents. The matching problem requires that we allocate exactly
1 unit of these items to all agents. The amount Cj available of each item j may be very small, so
the 1 unit allocated to an agent may need to be combined from small fractions of many different
items. An allocation {xij} for all agents i is a feasible solution of the matching problem, if∑
j
xij = 1 for all i ∈ [n]∑
i
xij ≤ Cj for all j ∈ [m]
xij ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m]
We assume agent i has value vij for a unit of item j. So her value for a set of {xij} amounts of
each item j is
∑
j vijxij , assuming
∑
j xij = 1.
More generally, we can require to allocate different amounts for different agents, and allow the
matching constraint to be only an upper bound, that is, allocate at most 1 unit to each agent.
For simplicity of presentation, in this paper we will use equal amount required for the agents, and
normalize that value to 1. Further, we will assume, also for simplicity of the presentation only, that∑
j Cj = n, so a feasible solution to the matching problem will fully allocate all items.
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Fair Allocation: Matching Market. We use the Fisher market proposed by [HZ79] to make
the allocation fair. Fisher market is defined by giving each agent a unit of (artificial) money. A
market equilibrium is defined by a set of prices pj ∈ R≥0 for each item j. Given a set of prices, the
agent i’s optimization problem can be written as follows:
maximize
∑
j
vijxij
subject to
∑
j
xij = 1 (The matching constraint)∑
j
xijpj ≤ 1 (The budget constraint)
xij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ [m] .
A market equilibrium for this market is a set of prices p, and a feasible allocation x such that (i)
xi is an optimal solution to agent i’s optimization problem with respect to prices p and her budget
of 1 unit of money. Note that the requirement of market clearing that all items are allocated, is
automatically satisfied due to the matching constraint and our assumption that
∑
j Cj = n.
The matching constraint in the agents’ preferences creates an odd demand structure. For
some prices the agent’s optimization problem is not feasible, and even on prices when all agent
optimization problems are feasible, the preferences do not satisfy the gross substitute property, i.e
increasing price of an item may increase the demand of that item, as explained in the introduction,
and an example is shown in Appendix B.1.
A natural idea to convert the problem to one with a simpler structure is to allow agents to have
free disposal, i.e., if assigned more than 1 unit of item, they value the best unit. Unfortunately, this
change in the model significantly changes the structure of the problem, and can result in market
equilibria that are simply not feasible for the original problem. Consider the following market with
2 agents and 2 items.
A1 A2
I1 I2
2 1 0 1
Let v1 = (2, 1) and v2 = (0, 1). Assume that the prices are p = (0.5, 1.5). When agent’s have
free disposal, these prices are equilibrium, since x1 = (1,
1
3) and x2 = (0,
2
3) is optimal for both
agents, and also clears the market. However, with matching market preferences these prices are
not equilibrium, since I1 will not get any of A2 and I2 cannot afford all of A2 so the prices are not
market clearing.
We note that it is possible to express this matching market problem as a classical Fisher market
with agent preferences that are piece-wise linear and concave (general PLC) functions, though
non-monotone and non-separable. To do this, we first relax the matching constraint in the agents’
optimization problem to requiring only that
∑
j xij ≤ 1. We will show that the market clearing
condition of a Fisher market requiring that all items are allocated (or have 0 price) will help to
enforce that all agents get exactly 1 unit. We can also express the agents’ utility as a piece-wise
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linear and concave function. To do this, let v∗i = maxj vij +  where  > 0. Let agent i’s utility for
an allocation xi
min(
∑
j
vijxij ,
∑
j
vijxij + v
∗
i (1−
∑
j
xij).
When
∑
j xij ≤ 1, the first term is smaller, but when
∑
j xij ≥ 1 the minimum is taken by the
second term, so the total value strictly decreases as the allocated amount exceeds 1. Since the
agent’s utility decreases with more than one unit allocated, an optimal solution to the agent’s
optimization problem will allocate at most 1 unit of item to each agent, and hence if the market
clears, this is also a solution to the matching market problem.
[DK08] provides a polynomial time algorithm to find the equilibrium prices and allocation for
the case with fixed number of goods. In Appendix A we give a simpler exact algorithm for this case,
taking advantage of the matching structure. Our main result is to extend this to the case of fixed
number of agents, instead of fixed number of items. [DK08] also offers an algorithm for finding
market clearing prices for with fixed number of agents, but only with separable PLC utilities, i.e.,
when the utility of each agent is a separable function of the items allocated to the agents. Note
that the utility function of a matching problem is necessarily not separable, as it needs to express
the upper bound on the total allocation.
The Cell Decomposition Technique Our algorithms will search the space of optimal utility
values of each agent, and for each possible utility value, will search through the possible structures
of allocations. There are only a fixed number of agents, however, the space of possible optimal
values is huge. We use a cell decomposition technique to make the search space discrete, facilitated
by a characterization of equilibria. The beginning of Section 3 has a more detailed outline.
A main technical tool for our work will be the following theorem concerning the way polynomials
divide the space in a d dimensional space. Given a set of polynomials on M variables, the sign
of the polynomials define an equivalence between vectors in the M dimensional space RM , where
two vectors y and y′ are equivalent if all polynomials have the same sign on y and y′. We call
the equivalence sets of this relations the cells of the way the polynomials divide up the space. In
principle N functions can divide up the space into at many as 3N cells (as each polynomial can
be 0 positive or negative). However, Basu, Pollack, and Roy [BPR98] showed that bounded degree
polynomials in small dimensional spaces define much fewer cells.
Theorem 2.1. [BPR98] If we have a set of M number of variables, and N number of polynomials
whose degree is at most d, then the number of non-empty cells, and the time required to enumerate
them is O(NM+1)dO(M).
We will use this decomposition to find the equilibrium for our matching problem. To illustrate
the idea, and let Rn be the space of all possible agent utilities. Roughly speaking the idea is as
follows. If we could describe whether a set of utilities u ∈ Rn arises from an equilibrium by the
signs of a few bounded degree polynomials in these variables, then we could use Theorem 2.1 to
enumerate all cells defined by these polynomials, and test which of the cells satisfies the condition
required for being an equilibrium. Unfortunately, the equilibrium condition cannot be described this
way, so we will need to introduce additional variables (helping us infer the prices and assignment,
despite the fact that these are not in fixed dimensional space) to be able to carry out this plan.
3 Computing Market Equilibrium with Fixed Number of Agents
In this section, we give an exact algorithm to find an equilibrium in the case where the number
of agents n is constant, and the number of different goods is an arbitrary number m ∈ N, under
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the mild technical assumption that each agent has a unique most preferred item. More formally,
for every agent i ∈ [n], there is exactly one item j such that vij = maxk∈[m](vik). The goal of this
section is proving the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Exact equilibrium (prices and allocations) in a matching market with fixed number
of agents, in which agents have additive values one unit of money, and a unique most preferred
item, can be found in polynomial time.
General Outline and Techniques. Our algorithm searches the space of agents’ optimal
utilities and item prices to find an equilibrium. We divide this space into a polynomial number
of cells, where each cell contains utility and price vectors that have the same properties. We use
Theorem 2.1 as the basis of the cell decomposition. The space of possible agent utilities is finite
dimensional. However, since the number of items is not constant, we cannot use a separate variable
for each item price. In section 3.1, we provide a bundling technique and a characterization of the
equilibrium structure that allow us to define equilibria using only a finite set of variables.
Cell. Consider the vector of player utilities u = {ui}, a constant dimensional space for fixed
number of agents. Now consider the linear functions ui − vij for each agent i and item j. A cell of
the space of utilities u defined by these functions is the region of this space in which each of these
functions has a fixed sign. Within each region, the items are divided for each agent i into those
with value above ui, same as ui, and below ui. This division also has implications on prices: if the
utilities are part of an equilibrium, the price pj of any item j with value vij > ui will have to be
above 1. We will add further variables and polynomials, until each cell provides enough information
for checking all the equilibrium properties.
Layered Cell Decomposition. Next we would like to add the item prices as variables.
However, to keep the running time polynomial when using Theorem 2.1, we can only have a
constant number of variables, so we cannot afford a variable for each item price. To get around
this problem we will try a polynomial number of different structures for the price vector, where for
any fixed structure, we can define all item prices via a fixed number of variables. To do this, for
each agent we will fix a special item that is at least partially allocated to the agent. Lemma 3.6
will show that given prices for the fixed number of special items, we can infer prices for all items.
Finally, we also need to be able to find the assignment variables. We will show in Lemma 3.8
that each pair of agents only shares a few items (at most 5), and given the set of shared items, as
well as the utilities and item prices, the allocation can be fully determined. Our algorithms iterates
over all structures of specially assigned items and shared sets of items. For each of these structures,
the algorithm iterates over all cells of the cell-decomposition given by agent utilities and prices of
special items and the constraint (polynomials) described in the next subsections that ensure that
these describe an equilibrium, and finds the ones which correspond to equilibria.3
Bundles. Rather than thinking about individual items in isolation, it is useful to think of
items in pairs. In equilibria each agent spends exactly one unit of money and gets exactly a total
of one unit of items. This means that in equilibrium, if an agent gets some amount an item whose
unit price is less than one, she should also get some amount of an item whose unit price is more
than one. As suggested by this fact, we pair items of price below and above 1. We define a bundle
as either a single item of price 1, or fractions of two items of a total of one unit of items, where
the total unit price of the bundle is exactly 1. First, we show that in a market equilibrium, the
allocations of items to agents, can be rewritten as the allocation of bundles to agents.
Lemma 3.2. In an equilibrium pricing p with equilibrium allocation x, there exists a bundling B
of items such that
3Recall that by [HZ79] (see also Appendix C) an equilibrium must exists.
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a. Each bundle b consists of at most two items. Two items j and k are in a bundle b = (j, k) if
and only if pj < 1 < pk. One item j forms a bundle b = (j) if and only if pj = 1.
b. Each bundle b = (j, k), associated with a unique mix 0 < αb < 1 such that αbpj + (1−αb)pk = 1
(recall that pj < 1 < pk). For bundles with one item we use αb = 1.
c. The optimum allocation of items to agent i satisfying the matching constraint can be rewritten
as allocation of bundles.
Proof. Let p be an equilibrium pricing and x be an arbitrary allocation associated with p. For
each agent i, we know that the total allocation of items to i and the the total cost of i’s items is 1
(due to the market clearing condition), i.e. ∑
j∈[m]
xij = 1
and ∑
j∈[m]
pjxij = 1
We start rewriting i’s allocation with bundles. Let yib be the amount of bundle b that i uses in the
new allocation (yib is zero at the beginning). At each step we consider the following cases
1. For every j that xij > 0, we have pj = 1: in this case all such items should be in a bundle
b = (j) (yib = xij), so our claim is correct.
2. There exists j that xij > 0 and pj > 1: This means that there exists another item j
′ such
that pj′ < 1 and xij > 0, otherwise if i gets t unit of items, her total cost cannot be t (note
that t = 1 here). So by the definition, j and j′ should be in a bundle b = (j, j′).
Let z = min(
xij
αb
,
xij′
1−αb ). In the second case, we increase yib by z, and reduce xij by zαb and
xij′ by z(1 − αb). This means that both the total cost of remaining allocation of x and the total
remaining items in allocation of x decrease by z. Note that by doing this the total allocation of
i (counting her allocation in xi and yi) does not change. Furthermore, either xij or xij′ becomes
zero.
If we repeat this process, yi gives us a way to rewrite the allocation of items to i as an allocation
of some bundles (Bi) to i. If we repeat this for all the agents, we get what we want.
For each agent i, the value of a bundle b = (j, k) is vib = αbvij + (1− αb)vik, while the value of
a single item bundle b = (j) is just the value vib = vij . Let Bi ⊆ B the set of bundles of maximum
value for agent i (called i’s optimum bundles).
Corollary 3.3. The optimum allocation of items to agent i is any allocation of bundles using only
bundles in Bi. Furthermore, utility of i in the equilibrium is ui = vib for the bundles b ∈ Bi.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume that y is the allocation of bundles to agents. Also
assume that there exists an agent i and a bundle b for which yib > 0 but there exists another
bundle b′ such that vib < vib′ . Since the unit price of the bundles is 1, and there is one unit of
items in them, i can trade her share of b for the same amount of b′ and increase her value. This is
a contradiction.
Now since the unit values of bundles that i uses are the same, and i gets exactly one unit of
bundles, her utility in equilibrium is equal to the unit value of these bundles. So the second claim
is also true.
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A key observation for using the bundles to define prices in Lemma 3.6 is the following exchange
property of optimal bundles.
Lemma 3.4. If b = (j, k) and b′ = (j′, k′) are optimum bundles of agent i (are in Bi), such that
pj , pj′ < 1 < pk, pk′, then b
′′ = (j, k′) and b′′′ = (j′, k) are also in Bi.
Proof. We prove this lemma by using contradiction. W.l.o.g assume that b3 /∈ Bi. If in equilibrium
i trade her bundles to get yib1 > 0 unit of b1 and yib2 > 0 unit of b2, then by lemma 3.3, her value
will not change. Now, since xij > 0 and xik′ > 0, similar to proof of lemma 3.2, we can rewrite
her allocation so that it includes some of b3, and similarly rewrite the remaining allocation of i
with other bundles. Since the unit value of i for b3 is less than value of i in equilibrium, this is a
contradiction with corollary 3.3 and we are done.
3.1 Characterizing the Prices and Optimum Bundles with Polynomials
In this subsection we define a set of variables and polynomials that help us determine agent utilities
and prices of all items at equilibrium. We consider assignments in the next subsection.
For each agent i, we define a variable ui which is i’s utility in the equilibrium. By Lemma 3.2,
we know that any equilibrium allocates bundles to agents, where each agent only gets one unit of
her optimum bundles Bi. Since we did not define variables for the prices yet, we cannot use prices
to define bundles, so we start by defining a set of item bundles for each agent just based on the
fact from Corollary 3.3 that optimum bundles must give value ui.
Candidate Bundles. For each agent i, we define a candidate bundle to be the items whose
value is ui, or the pair of items j and k such that vij < ui < vik, so there exists a unique 0 < α
i
jk < 1
such that αijkvij +(1−αijk)vik = ui. Note that the optimum bundles of i also satisfy this constraint
(by Corollary 3.3). This means that the optimum bundles of an agent is a subset of her candidate
bundles. In addition, the price of optimum bundles is exactly 1.
In order to find the set of candidate bundles of agent i, we define a polynomial vij − ui for
each agent i and item j. This way, each cell tells us for each item j, whether vij < ui, vij = ui or
vij > ui. For any two items j, k ∈ [m], j and k form a candidate bundle if vij < ui and vik > ui.
Similarly if for an item j, if ui = vij then j alone forms a candidate bundle. By the information
provided by each cell, for each agent i ∈ [n] and item j, k ∈ [m] that form a candidate bundle, we
define the ratio for the candidate bundle to be αijk =
ui−uk
uj−uk .
Not all the candidate bundles of agent i are in the set of her optimum bundles, since the price
of optimum bundles should be exactly 1. We first observe that the unit price of a candidate bundle
cannot be less than 1. This property of candidate bundles is useful in proof of lemma 3.6, allowing
us to infer all prices from prices on only a few items.
Lemma 3.5. In an equilibrium with prices p, all candidate bundles have price at least 1.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume that there exists an agent i such that the price of
one her candidate bundles b is less than one. Assume that i’s most preferred item is j. We have
the following cases
• b = (z) 6= (j): In this case, since i’s most preferred item is unique, there exists an  > 0 such
that if i gets 1− unit of item z and  unit of item j, her total price is still less than 1, but her
utility is more than viz. This is a contradiction since by the definition of candidate bundles,
i’s utility in equilibrium cannot be more than viz.
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• b = (j): In this case, we claim that x does not allocate any item to i other than j. Assume
this is not true. If i trades whatever she gets in the equilibrium with j, her price will be less
than 1, and since the maximum value for i is unique, her utility will increase. So it should
be the case that i does not spend all her money and market will not be cleared. This is a
contradiction with the assumption that the prices are market clearing.
• b = (k, z): Since the maximum value item of i is unique, her value b should be less than vij .
Now since the unit price of b is less than one, there exists  > 0 such that pj + (1− )pb < 1.
However, if i gets  from item j and 1−  from bundle b, his utility is more than vib. This is
a contradiction with the definition of candidate bundles.
So all the possible cases reach a contradiction and we are done.
Next we wish to find the prices for all items. We will show that if one knows for each agent her
utility, the price of only one item in her optimum bundles, and we use the set of candidate bundles
defined above, we can find a the price of all the items which are in one of her optimum bundles.
Lemma 3.6. Consider an equilibrium where we know for each agent i, the utility ui of the agent,
and the price of a single item j which is in a bundle of Bi with two items. Using these values, and
the notion of candidate bundles defined above, we can find the price of all items in polynomial time.
Proof. The key for finding the prices is the observation that if for a bundle b = (j, k), we have αb
and pj , then we can find pk. This fact, combined with lemma 3.4, imply that if for each agent i,
we know the price of one item in one of her optimum bundles, then we can find the price of all
the items in her optimum bundles. The only problem is that we do not know which one of her
candidate bundles is also one of her optimum bundles.
Assume that for each agent i, we know a good gi ∈ [m] is in one of her optimum bundles and we
have a variable for gi’s price. To find a formula for price of other items with the variables we have
defined so far, consider the following game. Assume that i is playing a game, in which she wants
to maximize the number of her optimum bundles. She can participate in this game by proposing
a price for all the items in her candidate bundles, knowing pgi and her candidate bundles. W.l.o.g
assume that pgi < 0. For each of her candidate bundles b = (gi, j), i first proposes price pj =
1−αbgi
1−αb
for item j, then for each of her candidate bundles b′ = (k, j), she proposes price pk =
1−(1−αb′ )pj
αb′
for item k. Finally she proposes price 1 for all the items which form a bundle alone. By doing this,
if any of her proposed prices is chosen, that item will be in her optimum bundles. Now, for each
item j, we, the game coordinator, choose the maximum price for j among all the prices which were
proposed by the agents for j and set that to be the price of item j.
Note that in equilibrium, we have to choose the maximum proposed price, since if we choose
less than that, the agents with higher proposals will have candidate bundles whose price is less
than 1, this is a contradiction with lemma 3.5.
In order to use the above lemma, we should be able to do two things: (i) For each agent i, select
an item j that is in one of i’s optimum bundle with two items (if such an item exists), and set its
price pj . (ii) For each item j, find the maximum proposed price among all the proposed prices for
that item, with proposed price of 1 of items in single item candidate bundles for any agent (including
agents with no special item). We can do the first task by checking all possible assignments of the
special items with defining O(mn) separate equilibrium structures for each possible selection of one
special item assigned to each agent, and checking them separately. Since the number of agents is
constant, the number of different equilibrium structures is polynomial. For each case, we use O(n)
variables, one for agent utility, and one for the price of the proposed special items for agents. To
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k z
Shared items
Items that j will not get
Items that i will not get
Lij
s
Figure 1: The nodes are the items in S (one side of G) that are in a optimum bundle of both i and
j (i < j), which are sorted by their prices. The figure shows the items that i and j share (green
nodes), the items that of i or j will not get in the special allocation (blue and yellow nodes).
define prices of other items, we use candidate bundles for each agent to define candidate prices,
add polynomial comparing the expressions for candidate prices. The actual price of the item is the
highest of all prices as shown in the proof of Lemma 3.6, which is now set uniquely in each cell.
Note that if an agent i is proposing a price for an item j which is higher than the proposed price
of another agent i′ and j is the special item of i′, then this cell cannot contain equilibria.
Lemma 3.7. Consider the space of at most 2n variables including agents’ utilities and price of
one item in each agent’s optimum bundles. Now we add O(mn2) polynomials: comparing utilities
to item values, and comparing candidate item prices using candidate budges, as defined in Lemma
3.6, the sign of these polynomials gives us a formula for the price of each item as well as the set of
optimum bundles of each agent.
3.2 Characterizing the Equilibria
In this section, we add a set of new variables and polynomials to the set of variables and polynomials
defined in Section 3.1, in order to determine whether each cell contains equilibria. The new variables
will help us define assignments. We cannot directly define a variable representing the allocation of
all goods/bundles to agents, since the number of these is not constant.
The key idea is to show that for every equilibrium pricing, there is a specific allocation of items
to agents where the number of items which is being shared between multiple agents is very small,
and the allocation has a special structure. This helps us to significantly reduce the number of
variables needed to define allocations. Consider two agents i < j, and all items of price pk < 1 in
sorted by price as shown by Figure 1. We will show that there is an equilibrium allocation with
only two of these items shared between i and j, and the structure indicated by the figure, and the
analogous structure for items of price pk > 1. If we know the shared items, this structure helps us
with finding the owner of the items which only have a single owner in the allocation, hence finding
the allocation of each agent using allocation variables only for shared items. Before stating the
properties of this allocation in Lemma 3.8, we have to define some notations.
Consider a bipartite graph G = (S, T,E) in which vertices in S are the items with price less
than 1 and vertices in T are the items with price more than 1. For simplicity, we sort items in each
side of G by their price and break ties with items’ indexes. Figure 1 is one side of this bipartite
graph. For each bundle, we put an edge in the graph which connects the two items in the bundle.
For every pair of agents i and j, let BSij = S ∩ (V (Bi) ∩ V (Bj)) and BTij = T ∩ (V (Bi) ∩ V (Bj)).
Furthermore, let H be the set of items whose price is 1 and let BHi be the optimum bundles of
agent i which has exactly 1 item.
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i's Optimum Bundles j's Optimum Bundles
c1 c2
d1 d2 d3
Figure 2: The arrows show the trades of items between agents i and j in the proof of Lemma 3.8.
For each pair of agents i and j, let LSij and L
T
ij be the list of items in B
S
ij and B
T
ij sorted by their
price in increasing order (break ties with index of the items), respectively, the set of items of price
above 1 (and below 1) that are part of optimum bundles for both i and j. Figure 2 is showing a
part of the above bipartite graph for a pair of agents.
The following Lemma claims that there is an equilibrium allocation of a special structure sug-
gested by Figure 1: on each side of the bipartite graph the agents share at most two items, and the
agent with lower index only gets items between the two shared items, while the agent with higher
index only gets items outside this interval as shown by Figure 1.
The main idea of the proof is that given any equilibrium allocation, we can make each pair of
agents that violate the properties trade their items, as illustrated by the Figure 2. Note that the
running time of this trading process is not important, since we only use it to show that for any
equilibrium pricing an allocation with the desired structure exists.
Lemma 3.8. For every equilibrium pricing p, there exists an equilibrium allocation x of items to
agents such that for every pair of agents i and j (1 ≤ i < j ≤ n)
1. There are at most 2 items that X is allocating to both i and j on each side of G. Furthermore,
if k and z are two items in S (T ) such that pk ≤ pz and i and j are sharing k and z, i only gets
items between k and z in the order sorted by price, while j does not get any of the items from
BSij (B
T
ij) whose whose position in L
S
ij (L
T
ij) is between k and z in the order (see Figure 1).
2. There is at most one item k in BHi ∩ BHj that is shared by i and j in x, and i only get items
from BHi whose index is lower than k and j only gets items whose index is higher than k.
Proof. Suppose that we have an allocation of bundles to agents y in an equilibrium. We want to
reallocate these bundles so that it satisfies the conditions of the lemma.
Assume that there exist two agents 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, such that there are tree bundles a1 = (c1, d1),
a2 = (c1, d2) and a3 = (c1, d3) such that a1, a2, a3 ∈ Bi and three bundles b1 = (c2, d1), b2 = (c2, d2)
and b3 = (c2, d3) such that b1, b2, b3 ∈ Bj . Suppose that pd1 ≤ pd2 ≤ pd3 and Y y is allocating
yid1 , yid3 > 0 of a1 and a3 to agent i, and yjd2 > 0 of d2 to agent j. Furthermore, assume that
yic1 , yjc2 > 0.
Since pd1 ≤ pd2 ≤ pd3 , there is 0 < β < 1 such that βpd1 + (1− β)pd3 = pd2 . So if we remove βz
from yid1 and (1− β)z from yid3 and add z to yid2 then the total cost of agent i will be the same.
Similarly, if we add βz to yjd1 and (1 − β)z to yjd3 and remove z from yjd2 , then the total cost
of j will not change. Furthermore, it is easy to see that doing this does not affect the matching
constraints. Figure 3 demonstrates this procedure.
Now, we have to show that doing this does not change the utility of i and j. From the assumption
that Y y is an equilibrium allocation, it follows that by doing this, the utility of i and j cannot
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i's Optimum Bundles j's Optimum Bundles
c1 c2
d1 d2 d3
Figure 3: Red and green arrows shows the trades of items between agent i and j in proof of lemma
3.8.
increase. Assume that by doing this utility of agent i decreases. We have
ui = αa2vid2 + (1− αa2)vic1
< αa2(βvid1 + (1− β)vid3) + (1− αa2)vic1
= βαa2vid1 + (1− β)αa2vid3 + (1− αa2)vic1
similarly we have
βαa2pd1 + (1− β)αa2pd3 + (1− αa2)pc1 = 1
This means that if agent i only use these three items with these ratios, he gets one unit of item,
spends at most 1 unit of money and her utility will be more than ui. This is a contradiction. The
argument for agent j is similar to the argument for agent i.
For each pair of agents 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, we find the cheapest item k and the most expensive item
z in S that i owns, if there is an item r in between k and z in the ordered list of items in S that
j owns, we switch the allocation we switch the ownership of these items until, one of the following
cases happen
• j runs out of item r.
• i runs out of item k.
• i runs out of item z
Let Φ be a potential function which is equal to |S| minus the the position of highest positioned
item that i owns in the ordered list, plus the position of the lowest positioned item that i owns in
the ordered list, plus the number of items for which j is a shareholder and are between the the two
in the ordered list. If we repeat the above procedure, each time this potential function will decrease
by 1. Since the potential function is always non-negative, we cannot continue the above procedure
forever. This means that at after some iterations, we will reach an equilibrium allocation which
satisfies the first condition for this pair of agents.
We repeat this procedure until such pair of agents and set of items with these properties do not
exist. We also do the same to the allocation of items on the other side of G (T ) to agents. For the
items in BHi ∩ BHj , one can also transfer items between i and j to satisfy the second condition by
finding two items that violate the condition and switch their ownership. The procedure defined for
satisfying these conditions are an easier version of the previous procedure.
From now on, we focus on finding and characterizing the specific equilibrium allocation which
is guaranteed to exist by this lemma. By using Lemma 3.8, for every pair of agents i, j ∈ [n] we can
use 5 item indexes fSij , r
S
ij , f
T
ij , r
T
ij , and hij that tell us which items are shared by agent i and j. We
can assume that we know what are these shared items by simply checking all the possible O(m5n
2
)
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of these combinations. At the start of the algorithm, we fix the 5 shared items for each pair of
agents and an item in optimum bundle of each agent (which we discussed in Section 3.1). We call
this set of items associated with each agent and pairs of agents the structure of the equilibrium.
For each such a structure, we will aim to decide if there is an equilibrium with the given structure.
When considering equilibria of a given structure, we define variables for the allocation of the
at most 5n2 shared items, but do not define variable for allocations of other items. Next we show
that given the allocations of the shared items, we can (i) infer allocations of all other items using
the structure of Lemma 3.8, and (ii) can also define polynomials whose sign will tell us if there is
an equilibrium with the given structure and allocation of shared items.
Since all the items should be sold in the equilibrium, for each agent i, all the items that are
in only in i’s optimum bundles, should get allocated to i. Second, we have defined a variable that
indicates the share of each agent for the shared items. The only thing left is to consider items that
are in the set of the optimum bundles of multiple agents, but are not shared by these agents.
Lemma 3.8 helps us find allocation of this set of items. We start with the agent with the lowest
index (agent 1) and one side of G, say S. The items that agent 1 gets, are the ones that satisfy
all the constraints given to us by second part of the lemma. In order to check whether for an item
j all these constraints hold, for each agent i, we can look at the position of item j in LS1i. If j’s
position is between position of fS1i and r
S
1i in the list, for all the choices of i > 1, then it satisfies
all the constraints. By lemma 3.8, we know this is a necessary and sufficient condition for j to get
allocated to agent 1. We do this for S and T separately, and remove the items that get allocated
to agent 1. Now, we repeat this procedure for agent 2, but only check the constraints for agents
i > 2, then remove the items that agent 2 gets. We repeat this for rest of agents based on their
indexes. We can do the same procedure for items in H to find which agent is getting what item.
Now, we are ready to exactly specify what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the prices
in each cell to be the equilibrium prices. This process is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.9. Consider a structure of special items for agents, and shared items between agents (as
defined after Lemma 3.8). Now consider a cell in the space of variables of agent utilities, prices
of the special items, and allocation shares of the shared items, defined by the polynomials that help
define prices of all items. The prices and allocation of this cell forms an equilibrium, if and only if
the allocation defined above satisfies the following constraints
1. All the items get fully allocated to agents.
2. Each agent gets exactly one unit of items.
3. For each agent i, the total cost of buying the items allocated to i is exactly 1.
4. For each agent i, each of the items allocated to i is in one of her optimum bundles.
Proof. ⇒ The first, second and third condition follow from the market clearing conditions. The
fourth condition directly follows from part c of lemma 3.2.
⇐ From the first and second condition, we know that the pricing and allocation are market
clearing. From the second, third and fourth condition, and the argument in proof of part c of
lemma 3.2 we know that the allocation of items to each agent can be rewritten as her optimum
bundles to her. So, from the definition of optimum bundles we know that the allocation of items
to agents is optimal. Therefore, the prices and allocation are in equilibrium state.
The final thing we need to do is to define a set of polynomials for checking the above conditions.
The first conditions holds for an item j, if summing up the share of each agent for that item, the
sum is equal to Cj . This can be handled by adding one polynomial for each item j.
The second condition holds for an agent i, if when we sum all the items (including the proportion
of the shared items) that i gets, this sum is exactly 1. So we can also check this condition by
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adding a polynomial for each agent. Note that we can do this since we explained how to find out
what is the allocation of items to agents for this cell.
The third condition holds by Lemma 3.9 if multiplying the share of each agent for an item
by its price and summing over all items, we get 1 for all the agents. We can do this by defining
a polynomial for each agent and checking its sign. The fourth condition is guaranteed to hold
by definition. The following theorem summarizes how we equilibria are cells of the constraints
discussed throughout this section.
Theorem 3.10. Consider an equilibrium structure, and the space of the O(n) variables for agents’
utilities and price of one special item in each agent’s optimum bundle, the O(n2) variables for
allocation of shared items between the agent. Divide this space into cells by the signs of the poly-
nomials defined in the previous section, along with the O(m2 + n) polynomials defined just above,
for checking the existence of the special equilibrium allocation. The sign of these polynomials fully
determines either that the vectors in this cell can be extended to form equilibria.
Using this structure Theorem allows us to prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We use theorem 2.1 as the base of our algorithm. We start by fixing
the structure of the equilibrium, selecting a single item from the optimum bundles of each agent,
and selecting fixing 5 items shared for every pair of agents. We check all the possible combinations,
at most O(mn+5n
2
) options, which is polynomial in m for fixed n.
For a given equilibrium structure, we use the O(n) variables, the agent utilities, and O(mn)
polynomials defined in section 3.1 to find a set of candidate bundles for each agent. Then we use an
additional O(n) variables, the prices of the special items for each agent, and O(mn2) polynomials
in order to find a formula for the prices and the set of optimum bundles of each agent in each cell.
Finally, we use the last set of O(n2) variables, the assignments of shared items, and O(m2 + n)
additional polynomials, in order to check whether the set of prices in the feasible cell are equilibrium
prices with the given structure. The degree of the defined polynomials is polynomial. We check
all the non-empty cells of the resulting system, taking time polynomial on m for any fixed n by
Theorem 2.1. Since the equilibrium exists, it should be in one of the non-empty cells.
Finally, if the prices of the cell are equilibrium prices, we take any vector from that cell, and
extend it to get an equilibrium pricing and allocation. After we have the equilibrium prices p, we
can also find each agent’s allocation by finding a solution of the following set of inequalities.
∑
b∈Bi
xib = 1 ∀i ∈ [n]∑
i
( ∑
b:b=(j,k)
αbxib +
∑
b:b=(k,j)
(1− αb)xib +
∑
b:b=(j)
xib
)
= Cj ∀j ∈ [m]
xib ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n], b ∈ B
In which, xbi is the amount of bundle b used by agent i. Note that since we know this bundling
is associated with an equilibrium, the feasible region of the above inequalities is not empty. Finally,
the allocation of each agent i for item j in this equilibrium is
xij =
∑
b:b=(j,k)
αbxib +
∑
b:b=(k,j)
(1− αb)xib +
∑
b:b=(j)
xib
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APPENDIX
A Fixed Number of Goods
In this section, we give a polynomial time algorithm which finds the exact value of equilibrium
prices and allocations when the number of goods is constant m and the number of agents is an
arbitrary number n ∈ N. In order to find an equilibrium, our algorithm uses a cell decomposition
technique which uses the algorithm proposed in [BPR98].
The goal of this section is to prove the following theorem by providing a polynomial time
algorithm.
Theorem A.1. Finding an equilibrium of a market with fixed number of goods in which agents
have additive values, one unit of money and matching constraints can be done in polynomial time.
A.1 Characterizing the Bundles with Polynomials
In this section, we define a set of variables, which represent the prices, and polynomials so that the
sign of polynomials in each cell determines the bundling and the optimum bundles of each agent
for the set of prices in that cell.
First, for each item j we define a variable pj to represent its price. We define m
2 polynomials
pj − pk for all j, k ∈ [m], pj for all j ∈ [m] and pj − 1 for all j ∈ [m] that give us the order of items’
prices, check whether price is non-negative and whether pj is less than, greater than or equal to
1, respectively. Recall lemma 3.2. Instead of finding equilibrium allocation of items to agents, we
focus on finding the allocation of bundles to agents.
By lemma 3.2 we know that each bundle should have price 1. It means that if items j and k are
in a bundle b, then pb = αbpj + (1−αb)pk = 1. We can rewrite this equation to get αb from pj and
pk, i.e. αb =
1−pk
pj−pk . So for every j, k ∈ [m], we define qjk =
1−pk
pj−pk , and when 0 ≤ qjk ≤ 1, it means
j and k form a valid bundle. Note that we don’t put j and k in a bundle unless pj 6= pk. Since in
each cell we know the order of prices, we can check whether pj = pk, pj > pk or pj < pk, then for
the last two cases, check whether 0 ≤ 1− pk ≤ pj − pk and 0 ≥ 1− pk ≥ pj − pk respectively. The
only thing left now is to check the bundles with only one item. Since an item forms a bundle if and
only if its price is exactly 1, we can do this by checking sign of pj − 1 for all the items. It is easy
to see that we can find whether each of these conditions hold by defining O(m2) polynomials and
checking their sign in each feasible cell.
Now, each output cell of the cell decomposition algorithm gives us the valid bundling associated
with the signs of the polynomials in that cell. We also wish to find the optimum bundles for each
agent. Note that for a valid bundle b = (j, k), qjk = αb. By corollary 3.3, we know that value
of each agent should be maximum for all of her optimum bundles. So given that for each bundle
b, we can write αb in terms of the prices, we can also write the value vib of each agent i for each
bundle b. So to find out which of the valid bundles is optimum, we can check the sign of vib − vib′
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for all i ∈ [n] and b, b′ ∈ B, and order the value of agents for bundles. This can be done by defining
O(nm4) number of polynomials. By adding these polynomials, each cell also tells us what is the
order of each agent over all the bundles, hence we can find the optimal bundles of each agent.
We can sum up the above arguments in the following lemma.
Lemma A.2. For each cell, defined by the above O(nm4) polynomials and O(m) variables, we can
use the signs of the defined polynomials in order to find the bundles and the optimum bundles of
each agent for the set of prices in that cell.
A.2 Characterizing the Equilibria
In the previous section we described how to define polynomial number of polynomials with constant
number of variables (prices) such that each cell specifies all the valid bundles and the optimum
bundles of each agent. We also showed how we can use these variables to get formulate αb (qjk) for
each bundle b = (j, k). In this section we describe how we can define a set of polynomials whose
sign tells us if a given bundling satisfies the equilibrium conditions.
One difficulty is that if we want our algorithm to run in polynomial time, we cannot directly
define a variable xij for each agent i and each item j, since the number of variables needs to remain
constant. In order to get around this problem, we define a variable for each bundle instead that
shows how much this bundle is used in equilibrium, and use these variables to check equilibrium
conditions.
Assume that we have an equilibrium E(x,p) and its valid bundling B. Let xb be the total
amount of bundle b ∈ B, which is used in this equilibrium. For a subset of agents S, let BS be
the union of all the optimum bundles of agents in S, i.e. BS =
⋃
i∈S Bi. In order to characterize
equilibrium bundles with variables xb and polynomials, we use the following lemma.
Lemma A.3. A pricing and its corresponding bundling is an equilibrium if and only if there exists
x ∈ R|B|≥0 such the following hold
a. For every subset of agents S, we have
∑
b∈BS xb ≥ |S|.
b. For every item j,
∑
b:b=(j,k) αbxb +
∑
b:b=(k,j)(1− αb)xb +
∑
b:b=(j) xb = Cj.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to proof of the Hall’s theorem. On one side of the bipartite
graph we have agents with capacity 1 and on the other side we have the bundles with capacity xb
(for each bundle b ∈ B). Furthermore, there is an edge between bundle b and agent i iff b ∈ Bi.
⇒ This case directly follows from lemma 3.2 and the market clearing conditions.
⇐ Assume that there is an X ∈ R|B| such that a and b hold. We have to show that there exists
an allocation of bundles to agents such that every agent gets exactly 1 unit of her optimum bundles.
We use contradiction. Assume that this allocation does not exists. Let Y be an allocation which
allocates maximum total amount of bundles to agents among all the valid allocations. Let i be an
agent for which Y allocates less than 1 unit of her optimum bundles. If there is an augmenting
path from i to a bundle b which is not fully consumed, then we can force the agents along this path
to deviate and increase the allocation of i without changing the total allocation, cost and utility of
other agents. This is a contradiction. Now assume that an augmenting path from i does not exist.
Let S be the set of agents and T be the set of bundles which are reachable from i. Since all the
bundles in T have been fully consumed by agents in S, and each agent in S has at most 1 unit of
bundles in T , we have ∑
b∈BS
xb < |S|
This is a contradiction, and we are done.
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The problem with lemma A.3 is that in order to check whether the first set of conditions hold,
for every subset of agents we have to define a polynomial and there are exponentially many of these
subsets. For a subset of bundles T , let A(T ) be the set of agents that for every agent i, i ∈ A(T )
if and only if Bi ⊆ T . In order to fix the problem, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma A.4. For every subset of agents S, we have
∑
b∈BS xb ≥ |S| if and only if for every subset
of bundles T ,
∑
b∈T xb ≥ |A(T )|.
Proof. ⇒ Let S = A(T ). By definition we know that BS ⊆ T . So we have
|A(T )| = |S| ≤
∑
b∈BS
xb ≤
∑
b∈T
xb
⇐ Let T = BS . By definition we know that S ⊆ A(T ). So we have
|S| ≤ |A(T )| ≤
∑
b∈T
xb =
∑
b∈BS
xb
Note that since the number of goods is constant, the number of subsets of bundles is also
constant. Lemma A.4 shows that when we know the bundles and optimum bundles of all agents,
we can find out whether the the first condition of lemma A.3 holds by defining a variable for each
bundle and checking polynomial number of inequalities. It is also easy to see that we can check the
second set of conditions by defining a polynomial (whose degree is a function of number of bundles)
for each agent, using the formula from the previous section for each αb.
We summarize the arguments in this section in the following lemma
Lemma A.5. For each output cell of theorem 2.1, defined by variables and polynomials in the
previous section and above O(m2) variables and O(2m
2
) polynomials, we can use the sign of the
defined polynomials to see if the prices in that cell are equilibrium prices.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to proof of the Hall’s theorem. On one side of the bipartite
graph we have agents with capacity 1 and on the other side we have the bundles with capacity xb
(for each bundle b ∈ B). Furthermore, there is an edge between bundle b and agent i iff b ∈ Bi.
⇒ This case directly follows from lemma 3.2 and the market clearing conditions.
⇐ Assume that there is an x ∈ R|B|≥0 such that a and b hold. We have to show that there exists
an allocation of bundles to agents such that every agent gets exactly 1 unit of her optimum bundles.
We use contradiction. Assume that this allocation does not exists. Let Y be an allocation which
allocates maximum total amount of bundles to agents among all the valid allocations. Let i be an
agent for which Y allocates less than 1 unit of her optimum bundles. If there is an augmenting
path from i to a bundle b which is not fully consumed, then we can force the agents along this path
to deviate and increase the allocation of i without changing the total allocation, cost and utility of
other agents. This is a contradiction. Now assume that an augmenting path from i does not exist.
Let S be the set of agents and T be the set of bundles which are reachable from i. Since all the
bundles in T have been fully consumed by agents in S, and each agent in S has at most 1 unit of
bundles in T , we have ∑
b∈BS
xb < |S|
This is a contradiction, and we are done.
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A.3 Finding an Equilibrium
So far, we have characterized the equilibria by defining constant number of variables and polynomial
number of polynomials. Now we put the pieces together to prove theorem A.1.
Proof of Theorem A.1. We use theorem 2.1 with variables and polynomials defined in
section A.1 and A.2. Theorem A.1 iterates all the feasible cells of these polynomials. Each cell
gives us the sign of all these polynomials. The signs of these polynomials tell us
1. What are the bundles and optimum bundles for each agent, by lemma A.2.
2. Whether these bundles are associated with a market equilibrium, by lemma A.5.
Finally, if a bundles associated with a cell is characterizing an equilibrium bundling, we sample
a set of prices from that cell. Now that we know equilibrium prices, it is easy to find the bundles
as before. We can also find each agent’s allocation by finding a solution of the following set of
inequalities
∑
b∈Bi
xib = 1 ∀i ∈ [n]∑
i
( ∑
b:b=(j,k)
αbxib +
∑
b:b=(k,j)
(1− αb)xib +
∑
b:b=(j)
xib
)
= Cj ∀j ∈ [m]
xib ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n], b ∈ B
In which, xbi is the amount of bundle b used by agent i. Note that since we know this bundling
is associated with an equilibrium, the feasible region of the above inequalities is not empty. Finally,
the allocation of each agent i for item j in this equilibrium is
xij =
∑
b:b=(j,k)
αbxib +
∑
b:b=(k,j)
(1− αb)xib +
∑
b:b=(j)
xib
Note that since theorem 2.1 iterates over all the possible feasible cells, if the equilibrium exists,
our method finds it. Furthermore, our method can characterize all the equilibrium cells.
Since the number of variables is constant (O(m2)), the number of polynomials is polynomial in
the number of agents (O(2m
2
+nm4)) and all the polynomials that we define have constant degree
(O(m2)), our algorithm runs in polynomial time.
B Examples
B.1 Examples from the Preliminaries
Interim Pareto-efficiency of RSD It is well known that RSD is ex post Pareto-efficient (effi-
cient after the random choices are made), but not interim Pareto-efficient. From the perspective
of a fixed agent, ordinal preferences are not always sufficient for ranking the interim outcomes of a
mechanism (i.e., ranking of distributions over outcomes), even though they are sufficient for rank-
ing the ex-post outcomes. However, in the example below, ordinal preferences are enough to show
that the interim outcomes are not Pareto-efficient. Consider the following example with agents
A1, . . . ,A4 and items I1, . . . , I4 in which the preferences of the agents are indicated on the edges
(only the first two top choices of each agent).
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A1 A2 A3 A4
I1 I2 I3 I4
1st 2nd 2nd 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 1st
Let xij denote the probability that agent i gets item j assuming the items are allocation using
RSD. Notice that A1 gets I2 when the agents are served in the order A3,A1,A2,A4. Similarly A2
gets I1 when the agents are served in the order A4,A2,A1,A3. Therefore both x12 and x21 are
strictly positive. However that implies the allocation is not interim Pareto-efficient because A1 and
A2 would both strictly benefit by exchanging some fraction of their allocation of I1 and I2.
Pareto-efficiency with cardinal versus ordinal preferences Cardinal and ordinal prefer-
ences are different in evaluating outcomes. In the next example the RSD interim allocations is
interim Pareto inefficient with cardinal preferences, even though with the corresponding ordinal
preferences would not have been interim Pareto ifefficient. Consider the following example in
which the valuation of each agent for each item is specified on the corresponding edge and  < 0.5.
A1 A2 A3
I1 I2 I3
1  0 1 1−  0 1 1−  0
All of the agents in the above example have the same ordinal preferences, but different cardinal
preferences. Running the RSD mechanism would yield an allocation of xi = (
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3) for each agent
i ∈ [3] which would have been Pareto-efficient for the corresponding ordinal preferences. However
this allocation is not Pareto efficient for the above cardinal preferences because it is strictly Pareto
dominated by the following allocation for any λ ∈ [0, 1]:
x1 =
(1
3
+
λ(1− ) + (1− λ)
3
, 0,
1
3
+
λ+ (1− λ)(1− )
3
)
,
x2 = x3 =
(1
3
− λ(1− ) + (1− λ)
6
,
1
2
,
1
3
− λ+ (1− λ)(1− )
3
)
.
Basically the interim RSD allocation can be Pareto improved by agent 1 trading its whole share of
item 2 with agent 2 and 3 in return for a smaller share of item 1 where item 3 is just traded as a
dummy item to allow the total allocation of each agent to remain equal to 1.
Odd Demand Structure As mentioned in the Introduction, the agents demand in the matching
problem exhibits some peculiar properties, that make the market equilibrium problem challenging
to solve. The demand function does not satisfy the gross substitutability condition: increasing the
price of an item (while keeping all other prices fixed) may actually increase the demand of the
agent for that item. Here we provide an example of this phenomenon. Let vij ∈ R+ denote the
valuation of agent i ∈ [n] for item j ∈ [m]. Given a price vector p ∈ Rm≥0, the optimal demand
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bundles of agent i are the solutions of the following linear program whose objective value is the
optimal expected utility of the agent:
maximize
∑
j
vijxij (1)
subject to
∑
j
xijpj ≤ 1 (αi)∑
j
xij ≤ 1 (βi)
xij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ [m] .
Let αi ∈ R≥0 and βi ∈ R be the dual variables corresponding to the first and second constraint
respectively. The dual of the above program is as follows:
minimize αi + βi (2)
subject to αipj + βi ≥ vij , ∀j ∈ [m] (xij)
αi, βi ≥ 0.
It is easy to see that βi = maxj(vij − αipj) in any optimal assignment. By eliminating βi from the
above program and rearranging the terms we can derive the optimal utility of agent i as a function
of the prices as
ui(p) = min
αi≥0
gi(αi,p), (3)
in which
gi(αi,p) = αi + max
j
+
(
vij − αipj
)
. (4)
The max+ operator is taken over linear functions of αi, therefore gi(αi,p) is piecewise linear and
convex in αi for every fixed p. Consequently ui(p) can be computed easily using a linear search
over αi by checking only the endpoints of the linear pieces.
Next, we compute the optimal fractional demand bundle xi of agent i at price vector p. Let
Di(p) be the set of all items j which are maximizers of Eq. (4) in which αi is a minimizer of
Eq. (3). Assuming αi is non-zero, the minimum of gi(αi, p) takes place either at the intersection
of a linear piece with negative slope and a linear piece with a positive slope, or on a linear piece
with a zero slope. The slope of the line segment corresponding to item j is 1− pj . Therefore, there
must exist j′, j′′ ∈ Di(p) such that pj′ ≥ 1 ≥ pj′′ . 4 In general Di(p) may include more than two
items, however in the most common case we have Di(p) = {j′, j′′} where pj′ > 1 > pj′′ . Notice
that xij can be non-zero only if j ∈ Di(p). Furthermore complementary slackness implies that if
αi > 0, then the budget must be completely spent. So we have two possibly non-zero variables
(i.e., xij′ , xij′′) and two tight constraints (i.e., the first and second constraints in Program 1 which
can be solved to get
xij′ =
1− pj′′
pj′ − pj′′ ,
xij′′ =
pj′ − 1
pj′ − pj′′ .
4Note that j′ and j′′ might be the same if pj′ = 1.
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Next we show that the agent’s utility function does not satisfy the weak gross substitutability
condition. Suppose pj′′ is increased by a positive amount which is small enough not to cause Di(p)
to change. The derivative of xij′ with respect to pj′′ is
dxij′
dp
j′′
=
1− pj′
(pj′ − pj′′)2 < 1
which means increasing the price of item j′′ would decrease the agent’s demand of item j′ which
violates the gross substitutability requirement. Surprisingly, that also implies increasing the price
of item j′′ must increase the demand for item j′′ itself because xij′ + xij′′ = 1.
C Existence of Equilibria
In this appendix we prove the existence of a market equilibrium by constructing a corresponding
concave game with convex externality constraints as formally defined in Appendix C.1 such that
any equilibrium of the concave game corresponds to a market equilibrium. We then show that this
game satisfies the requirements of Theorem C.3 which implies it has an equilibrium, hence a market
equilibrium exists.
Given a market with n unit demand agents and m items with Cj copies for each item j ∈ [m],
we define an n+ 1 player concave game as follows. For each i ∈ [m], player i corresponds to agent
i in the market and chooses xi ∈ Rm≥0 to optimize the following linear program:
maximize
∑
j
vijxij (5)
subject to
∑
j
xijpj ≤ 1∑
j
xij ≤ 1
xij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ [m] .
Player 0 corresponds the market maker and chooses the price vector p ∈ Rm≥0 to optimize the
following linear program:
maximize
∑
j
(
∑
i
xij − Cj)pj (6)
subject to
∑
j
Cjpj ≤ n
pj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ [m] .
Lemma C.1. Any equilibrium of the above game corresponds to an equilibrium of the original
market.
Proof. It is easy to see that in any equilibrium of the game the action of player i, xi, is an optimal
allocation for agent i of the original market with respect to price vector p. So we only need to
verify that the market clearing conditions are also satisfied. It is easy to see that if there are over-
allocated items, then player 0 (market maker) should have chosen a price vector p that would make
the object value of Program 6 strictly positive and would also make the first constraint tight. But
a strictly positive objective means the total amount of money spend by all agents,
∑
j(
∑
i xijpj),
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is more than
∑
j(
∑
iCjpj) which is itself equal to n by tightness of the first constraint, hence a
contradiction. On the other hand, if there is any under-allocated item, the market maker should
have assigned a price of 0 to that item, hence all agents must be fully allocated.
Theorem C.2. A market equilibrium for the original market always exists.
Proof. By Theorem C.1 an equilibrium for the original market exists if the corresponding concave
game has an equilibrium. By Theorem C.3 a concave game has an equilibrium if every player has
a default action that lies strictly inside the feasible set of actions for that player for all possible
actions of other players. Let  = 1/(n
∑
j Cj). A default action for player 0 is given by p
0
j =  for
every j ∈ [m]. A default action for each player i ∈ [n] is given by x0ij =  for all j ∈ [m].
C.1 Multi Agent Concave Games with Externality Constraints
In this section we prove more generally the existence of an equilibrium for a general class of games
in which both the utility function and the set of feasible actions for a player may depend on the
actions of the other players. Formally, suppose there are n players and the optimal utility of player
i ∈ [n] is captured by the following convex program
maximize vi(xi,x−i) (7)
subject to hik(xi,x−i) ≤ 0 ∀k ∈ [di]
xi ∈ Si ⊆ Rmi
in which xi is the action of player i; x−i is the vector of actions of players other than i; vi is the
utility function of player i which is concave in xi and continuous in all arguments; Si ⊂ Rmi is a
compact and convex set representing the feasible actions of player i; and hik is convex in xi and
continuous in all arguments. Define S = S1 × · · · × Sn. A vector of actions x = (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ S
is an equilibrium iff xi is an optimal assignment for Program 7 for each i ∈ [n]. The next theorem
establishes that an equilibrium always exists under a mild assumption.
Theorem C.3. If for each player i ∈ [m] there exists a default action x0i ∈ Si for which the first
set of constraints in Program 7 hold strictly for all x−i ∈ S−i, then an equilibrium always exists.
Proof. Define the set of optimal actions of player i in response to x−i ∈ S−i as
Ri(x−i) = {xi ∈ Si | xi is a solution to Program 7 with x−i} .
Define the collective optimal actions in response to y ∈ S as
R(y) =
{
x ∈ S ∣∣ xi ∈ Ri(y−i) ∀i ∈ [n]} .
It is easy to see that R is a set valued function from S to 2S whose fixed points correspond to the
equilibria of the game. We prove that R satisfies the requirements of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem
and therefore must have a fixed point which would then imply the existence of an equilibrium. It
is easy to see that S is a non-empty compact and convex set, and that R(y) is a also a non-
empty compact convex set for every y ∈ S. Therefore we only need to prove that R has a closed
graph. Formally, we need to show that for any sequence (xt,yt)t∈N where xt ∈ R(yt) for all t ∈ N, if
limt→∞(xt,yt) = (x∗,y∗), then x∗ ∈ R(y∗). Consider Program 7 in which x−i set to y∗−i. From the
continuity of hik and compactness of Si, it follows that x
∗
i is a feasible action for player i in response
to y∗−i, so we only need to show that it is also optimal. Pick any x
†
i ∈ Ri(y∗−i). We will prove
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optimality by showing that vi(x
∗
i ,y
∗
−i) ≥ vi(x†i ,y∗−i). Recall that vi(x∗i ,y∗−i) = limt→∞ vi(xti,yt−i),
so ideally we would like to show that vi(x
t
i,y
t
−i) ≥ vi(x†i ,yt−i), however x†i may not even be a feasible
action in response to yt−i for any t and therefore such an inequality may not hold in general. This
is where we use the assumption of the theorem to show that there exists an action x′i
t between xti
and x†i which is feasible for player i in response to y
t
−i for all t and also converges to x
†
i as t→∞
which will imply the desired inequality as follows:
vi(x
∗
i ,y
∗
−i) = lim
t→∞ vi(x
t
i,y
t
−i)
≥ lim
t→∞ vi(x
′
i
t
,yt−i)
= vi(x
†
i ,y
∗
−i).
To define x′i
t, we first define the following two quantities in which x0i is the default action of player
i:
δt = max
(
0,max
i,k
hik(x
†
i ,y
t
−i)
)
δ0 = − max
i,k,x′′−i
hik(x
0
i ,x
′′
−i).
Note that δ0 > 0 because of the hypothesis of the theorem. Let λt = δ
0
δ0+δt
. Define x′t = λtx† +
(1− λt)x0. First notice that x′it is a feasible response to yt−i because
hik(x
′t
i,y
t
−i) ≤ λthik(x†i ,yt−i) + (1− λt)hik(x0i ,yt−i) by convexity of hik in x′ti
≤ λtδt − (1− λt)δ0 by definition of δt and δ0
= 0 by definition of λt.
Second, notice that continuity of hik guarantees limt→∞ δt = 0, which implies limt→∞ λt = 1 (recall
that δ0 > 0), which implies limt→∞ x′t = x† as claimed.
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